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Collapse of a Communist Giant–A Study of Party Unity in the Soviet Union 
Abstract 
This thesis seeks to analyze the breakdown of the unity of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) over policy disputes through three case studies: the withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, the cooperative movements, and the concessionist policy towards nationalist 
movements in the Baltic republics. Through a content analysis of primary sources including 
meeting minutes, diaries, newspaper sources and interviews, to ascertain the positions and 
opinions of party members and give insight into the party dialogue and atmosphere, revealing 
policy disagreements tied to contending values. This thesis finds that there was a breakdown in 
party unity during the Gorbachev era due to incompatibility of glasnost, perestroika and 
democracy with the traditional methods of coercion and highly centralized control of politics and 
the economy. As a result of this disunity, the CPSU was unable to maintain power, thus resulting 
in the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
Introduction 
At the end of the twentieth century, the world witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
one of the most unexpected and expeditious transformations that altered the international system. 
Even though the Communist Party (CPSU) withstood a number of crisis in its 70-year existence– 
including a Civil War, rapid industrialization, the Great Terror, and various leadership 
succession crisis–the breakdown of party unity due to the Afghan War, the evolution into a 
hybrid market economy under Gorbachev, and the rise of nationalist and independence 
5 
 movements posed serious threats to the Soviet state’s survival. As a result of the increasing 
fragmentation of party unity during Gorbachev’s rule, the Soviet Union disintegrated.  
The Russian Revolution followed Marxist-Leninist ideological lines as the working class 
revolted violently, overthrowing the tsarist elite to create a communist party-state. From its 
inception, Vladimir Lenin, the CPSU’s first General Secretary, emphasized the primacy of party 
unity to the continuance of the Soviet state. In his “On Party Unity” speech on March 16, 1921, 
he urged Party members to maintain discipline and to resist factionalism to ensure the Party’s 
and the state’s survival: 
In order to ensure strict discipline within the party and in all Soviet work, and to 
achieve maximum unity while eliminating all factionalism, the Congress gives the 
Central Committee full powers to apply all measures of party punishment up to 
and including expulsion from the party in cases of violation of discipline or of a 
revival or toleration of factionalism.   1
 
Since the party’s inception, the party’s unity remained strong due to the ferocity of leaders such 
as Josef Stalin who silenced voices of dissent and consolidated power. Since the Politburo was 
the supreme policy-making body of the Soviet Union, its membership typically included the 
Minister of Defense, the chairman of the KGB, and the other heads of important party 
organizations. Members of the Politburo were in theory elected by the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, but in reality the Politburo acted independently, deciding its members for 
itself. Since Stalin’s time in power, the general secretary of the Communist Party served as the 
chairman of the Politburo and was in effect the leader of the Party and the Soviet Union. 
Historically, the majority of power was centralized and concentrated in Moscow with little power 
allocated to the republics or localities, despite having some First Secretaries of the Republic 
1 Vladimir Lenin, “On Party Unity” (speech, Moscow, March 16, 1921), Soviet History Archive, 
https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/party-congress/10th/16.htm 
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 Parties serving as members of the Politburo. ​ ​When Mikhail Gorbachev became the General 
Secretary of the CPSU, he pursued his radical reform policy called perestroika and the 
restructuring of the party apparatus. He also encouraged debate within the Party and public 
critique of its past performance as part of his free speech policy, glasnost. Allowing open dissent 
within the Party created an opportunity for factionalism to arise, and due to policy disagreements 
surrounding the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, perestroika and how to respond to 
nationalist disintegration, this contrary atmosphere threatened party unity.  
The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan created rival factions within the security 
apparatus and within the party. This decision also provoked ideological questions damaging the 
Soviet prestige as a leader of the socialist world. As the Soviet Union’s economy further 
stagnated, Gorbachev sought cuts in military expenditures as a way to reinvest in industry, but 
the reduction in security investment sparked concern within the security apparatus. Divisions 
arose between the KGB and the Soviet army as the army found it too costly, economically and in 
human lives, to remain in Afghanistan, while the KGB wanted to prolong Soviet involvement to 
secure the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Soon the factionalism within the 
PDPA became a proxy-war battleground for the factions of the Soviet security apparatus.  
The attempt to transition to a market economy incited polarization within the party as the 
ambiguity surrounding perestroika, the lack of cohesiveness with socialist ideology, and 
subsequent security concerns emanating from the economic reforms were met with conservative 
attitudinal and institutional barriers. Specifically, the creation of economic cooperatives, which 
was a private enterprise initiative, was a source of contention as it contradicted ideology and 
entrenched power relations, and it faced conservatives efforts to delay or stunt the reforms. As a 
7 
 result, the economy worsened due to halfway reform measures resulting from party infighting, 
causing an increase in polarization within the party. 
Restructuring and glasnost also fueled the rise of People’s Fronts within the Soviet 
republics as nationalist groups were allowed to mobilize under the banner of glasnost. The 
nationalist movements called for the increased use of national symbols such as languages and 
flags, and eventually they even called for sovereignty. The demand for independence within the 
Baltic Republics sparked bitter in-party debate, and it threatened the influence and supremacy of 
the Soviet Union.  The party divided over how to face the increasing nationalist demands with 
reformists advocating for increased concessions to the movements and the more conservative 
forces, such as the security apparatus, advocating for military or police intervention, which was 
the traditional method of maintaining control over the republics.  
Previous research has glossed over the potential effects of party unity and instead 
maintained a linear, two-step approach to the collapse. This thesis seeks to create a more narrow 
approach through the addition of a critical step–fragmentation of party unity. Given the 
importance of party unity, rather than study the collapse in terms of some external factor leading 
to the fall of the USSR, this thesis argues that the external factors caused a loss in party unity 
which is why the Soviet system dissolved. Although during the last years of the Soviet Union, 
the state performed a more technocratic role and the Party’s role was to generate ideas and 
policies for the state to carry out, the unity of the Party was still an integral factor for state 
survival. Following from this understanding, this thesis will examine fragmentation through 
three case studies: first, the decision to withdrawal from Afghanistan; second, the transition to a 
market economy; and third, nationalist disintegration and federalization of the Soviet Union. 
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 These cases are significant as they incited factionalism within the party that threatened the 
party’s essential unity.  Overtime, as party members hotly contested how to deal with the Afghan 
war, economic reform, and rising nationalist movements, increasingly salient divisions 
developed within the Party that ultimately resulted in a failed coup and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
 
Literature Review 
 Scholars have identified several causes for the collapse: poor leadership, the 
consequences of the Afghan war, economic stagnation, and widespread nationalist disintegration. 
In his work, ​The Gorbachev Factor, ​Archie Brown examined Gorbachev’s role and influence in 
the Soviet Union’s transition to a more democratic political system, and he considered the 
constraint the opposition forces could have imposed on Gorbachev’s ability to implement 
reform. Brown concluded that Gorbachev played the role of a reformer, but the consequences of 
encouraging debate within the party resulted in the ‘pluralism of opinion.’  With the potentially 2
explosive political mixture threatening the party, Brown asserted:  
These could only be controlled and the entire party kept together on the 
basis of Leninist discipline and an intransigent hostility towards factions and 
splits.  3
 
George Breslauer also explored the role of the leadership in the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. In his publication, ​Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders, ​Breslauer examined Gorbachev’s 
and Yeltisn’s leadership strategies given the political, institutional and ideological constraints 
they faced. By 1989, as contradictions within perestroika became obvious, and as glasnost 
2 Archie Brown, ​The Gorbachev Factor ​(Oxford University Press, 1996), 311. 
3 Brown, 312. 
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 revealed the incompatibility of Leninism and liberalism, Gorbachev’s legitimacy as a leader was 
threatened.  As both reformist and conservative critics increased their challenge to Gorbachev 
over the restructuring, Gorbachev attempted to bridge the political spectrum. However, 
ultimately political polarization rose and his political base weakened. As his attempt as 
moderator failed to contain radical forces, Gorbachev engaged in a “pattern of pendular swings 
as a means of recouping authority.”  However, this tactic also failed as the party was too 4
polarized, and it incited a conservative coup following Gorbachev’s shift to realign with the 
reformists in the beginning of 1991. 
Stephen Kotkin examined the role of the Soviet elite and economic decline in the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in his work ​Armageddon Averted. ​Kotkin argued that perestroika devastated 
the command economy, the party, and the faith in Soviet socialism. Notably, he stated “the blow 
to the party unhinged the Union, which the party alone had held together.”  His work revealed 5
the consequences of socialism’s inability to reform and the inability of institutions and the 
centrally-planned economy to adapt to market forces, resulting in widespread disillusionment 
and ultimate collapse. Anders ​Åslund accounted for the economic crises and the transformation 
into a market economy for the Soviet collapse.  He discussed how the growth of economic 6
cooperatives, which were economic incentives for the legalization of small businesses to allow 
for more of the black market to become taxable, and other somewhat free-market ventures 
resulted in less centralized control of trade and the economy at the individual level. This 
economic evolution and experimentation became a topic of debate among party members due to 
its departure from Marxist-Leninist institutions.  
4 George W. Breslauer, ​Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders ​(Cambridge University Press, 2002), 106. 
5 Stephen Kotkin, ​Armageddon Averted ​(Oxford University Press, 2001), 3. 
6 Anders ​Åslund, ​How Russia Became a Market Economy ​(Brookings Institution, 1995). 
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 Ronald Suny and Mark Bessinger attributed the collapse of the Soviet Union to 
nationalist mobilization. They discussed how Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost​ ​allowed for 
nationalist and independence groups within the Soviet republics to gain more momentum. With 
such an expansive territory encompassing a multitude of languages, cultures and religions, 
questions about national identity versus a collective international Soviet identity emerged and 
threatened the CSPU’s legitimacy and unity. Ronald Grigor Suny discusses how the emergence 
of People’s Fronts and the subsequent division between Russian-speaking and non-Russian 
speaking peoples in the republics fueled calls for sovereignty and independence, threatening the 
strength of the Union and the influence of the CPSU.  Bessinger examined how as a result of 7
liberalization and the threats non-Russian nationalist movements posed to Russian dominance, 
the Russian mobilization bolstered the inevitability of the collapse of the Soviet state as they, 
too, identified themselves as “victims of Soviet ‘imperial’ domination.”   8
 
Methodology 
This thesis employs textual analysis of primary sources from the Soviet press along with 
diaries and memoirs from Soviet leaders during the period 1979-1991.​  The principal sources for 
this thesis are the minutes of Politburo meetings and CIA reports sourced from the ​Wilson 
Archive​ and the ​National Security Archive​, as well as speeches and public statements from 
various party members as reported in the two main Soviet newspapers, ​Pravda ​and ​Izvestia. 
These sources document the positions and opinions of party members and give insight into the 
7 Ronald G. Suny, ​The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet 
Union ​(California: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
8 Mark R. Bessinger, ​Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State ​(Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 387. 
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 party dialogue and atmosphere, revealing policy disagreements tied to contending values. The 
parameters of this study spanned the years 1979 to 1991 and reviewed the Soviet leadership 
during the later Brezhnev years through Gorbachev’s years as General Secretary. Even though 
the Soviet press was more heavily censored during the earlier chronology of this study, the bulk 
of the research is concentrated during the Gorbachev’s era during the time of ​glasnost​, a rise of 
support and freedom for the intelligencia,​ ​and less censorship of the press. Additionally most of 
the analysis examines the late 1980s and early 1990s because it was during this time that the 
USSR pulled out of Afghanistan, the economy underwent liberal reforms, and nationalist 
disintegration rose. This thesis contends with the unspoken nature of censored journalism 
through an analysis of the journals of elite Party members, Party meeting notes, and interviews. 
The following three chapters will look at a particular case for the collapse of the Soviet 
Union to analyze fragmentation and policy debates within the party. The first chapter examines 
the decision to withdraw from Afghanistan and its effects on party unity. The second chapter 
analyzes the effects of economic reform policy, in particular the cooperative movement, on party 
unity. Finally, the third chapter explores policy in response to nationalist disintegration, 
specifically within the Baltic republics, and the effect on party unity. Through these case studies, 
this thesis seeks to accomplish an analysis of the breakdown of party unity in the Soviet Union.  
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 Chapter I The Afghan War and Party Unity 
Prior to the Afghan war, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev pursued a policy of détente 
with Western powers. In efforts to reduce economic strain due to the arms race between the 
superpowers, the USSR and the US agreed to the Salt I and II treaties of 1972 and 1979, 
respectively. Despite these efforts, the decision to invade Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, 
ended the more peaceful relationship with the west and engulfed the Soviet Union in a long, 
fruitless war. As the war effort stagnated and the Soviet economy worsened under this military 
burden, Party members began to debate withdrawing troops and ending the war. With the 
ascension of Gorbachev to General Secretary in 1985, serious talks within the Politburo occurred 
about withdrawing from Afghanistan. In accordance with the Geneva agreements on facilitating 
peace in the region, the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan on February 16, 1989, after a decade 
without any progress towards Soviet goals.  
Artemy Kalinovsky explored Party decision-making during the war and analyzed the 
structure and unity of the party from the decision to invade through the long process of 
withdrawal. Kalinovsky described how decision-making at the hands of a few elite members 
within the Politburo was a characteristic of policy making during the late Brezhnev era. This 
allowed the party elite to use “their seniority and closeness to the CPSU General Secretary… to 
sideline most critics” and form “a consensus among themselves.”  The inner circle included 9
Brezhnev and the Politburo’s Commission on Afghanistan, which was composed of the “troika,” 
or Foreign Minister A. Gromyko, Defense Minister D. Ustinov, and KGB Chairman Y. 
Andropov, as well as party conservative and head of the CPSU International Department B. 
9Artemy Kalinovsky, “Decision-Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to 
Withdrawal,” ​Journal of Cold War Studies ​11:4 (2009), 46-48. 
13 
 Ponomarev.  Brezhnev’s speechwriter and advisor Aleksandrov-Agentov also had Brezhnev’s 10
ear.  
Kalinovsky also detailed the division in party unity due to the internecine fighting 
between senior KGB and military officials. The division was present at the beginning of the 
invasion as Brezhnev and his inner circle followed the KGB’s advice to invade, ignoring the 
suggestions and warnings of the Soviet military that would pay the price of the invasion. The rift 
grew worse near and during the withdrawal as policy-making on Afghanistan began to resemble 
that of its early years–controlled by a few key individuals who had influence over the General 
Secretary, limiting the input of military officials. While the party dynamics during withdrawal 
resembled the dynamics during the invasion, during the latter period, factionalism within the 
party was not controlled as in-party debate was encouraged during the Gorbachev era. 
Therefore, without the strict discipline that Lenin urged for the party, factionalism was able to 
rise relatively unchecked.  
In 1980, Marshal Ogarkov, General Varennikov, and General Sergei Akhromeev 
concluded that there was no military solution to the war, and the CPSU Politburo generally 
agreed that there was not much to salvage in Afghanistan and that the economic and political 
costs outweighed unlikely gains.  However, Gorbachev’s appointee and Foreign Minister 11
Eduard Shevardnadze and Vladimir Kryuchkov, the head of the foreign intelligence branch of 
the KGB, “formed the ‘Najibullah lobby’ within the Politburo, arguing that Soviet policy had to 
be based on firm support for [KHAD chief Mohammad Najibullah],” using military force if 
necessary to secure his position of power.  Kalinovsky also described a sort of 12
10 Kalinovsky, 49. 
11 Kalinovsky, 56. 
12 Kalinovsky, 64.  
14 
 proxy-factionalism within the CPSU as various groups supported different factions within the 
PDPA. The KGB supported the Parcham faction under Babrak Karmal they installed to power in 
1979, and the military supported the Khalq faction and the Khalq-dominated Afghan state’s army 
they helped to train.  This factionalism in the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 13
and the proxy-factionalism of the Soviet leadership heightened the tensions within the Party, 
creating distinct camps on the Afghan withdrawal policy.  
The Afghan war was damaging to the weak Soviet economy, USSR’s authority as a 
socialist leader, and also to the confidence of the security apparatus. The Afghan war polarized 
the Party over security concerns, economic consequences and ideological issues, and soon forces 
within the Party apparatus began to have a proxy war with party members aligning with the 
either KGB or the Soviet military officials supporting opposing Afghani Parcham-Khalqi 
factions in the PDPA.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 The nature of the Parcham-Khalq factionalism was rooted in differing views on the future of the PDPA 
and socialism. The Parcham faction advocated a gradual transition to socialism, while the Khalq faction 
desired a quick and violent government overthrow to impose a Soviet-style communist regime. (​Arnold, 
Anthony. Afghanistan, the Soviet Invasion in Perspective. Rev. and enl. ed. Vol. 321. Stanford, Calif: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1985.​) 
15 
 Analysis 
Table 1. Factions of Afghan Withdrawal Policy 
Withdraw from 
Afghanistan quickly 
Withdraw from 
Afghanistan gradually, 
maintain some Soviet 
presence, but do not send in 
more troops 
Maintain some Soviet 
troops to protect the PDPA, 
even send in more troops if 
needed 
Soviet Army Mikhail Gorbachev– General 
Secretary of the CPSU 
(1985-91) 
KGB 
Marshal Sergei Sokolov Andrey Gromyko–Chairman 
of the Supreme Soviet 
(Removed from office in 
1988) 
Eduard Shevardnazde– 
Minister of International 
Relations (1985-90) 
Marshal Sergei Akhromeev Yegor Ligachev– Secretary of 
Ideology (1985-88), Secretary 
of Agriculture (1988-90) 
Vadim Kryuchkov– KGB 
chairman (1989-90) 
 
Intervention, Military Stalemate and the Illusion of Party Unity (1978-1985) 
Several factors contributed to the inadvisable decision to invade Afghanistan and the 
difficulty with withdrawing Soviet troops. Firstly, the policymaking process towards Afghanistan 
was concentrated in a narrow circle of party elites in the Politburo, which formed the 
Commission on Afghanistan. Secondly, the usurpation of the Soviet-backed communist regime 
under President Nur Muhammed Taraki threatened the Soviet Union’s influence in the region, 
and Soviet influence was further threatened due to the mobilization of opposition groups with 
Pakistani and Western support. Thirdly, the competition among KGB advisors and military 
advisors in policymaking prolonged the war due to a lack of coordination. Key decisions the 
inner circle reached during the first few months of the war turned the intervention into a 
decade-long engagement. Another contributing factor for the invasion was that in discussing the 
16 
 Afghan question, Brezhnev did not try to obtain a wide range of opinions, and instead he relied 
on the troika and other members of the inner circle. Even more, “Aleksandrov-Agentov in the 
late fall of 1979 pressured those who were against the intervention to abandon their position.”  14
Therefore, through effectively silencing voices of dissent and those who could have 
circumvented the invasion, such as the military officials and intellectual advisors, the inner circle 
maintained party unity.  
After the invasion, the troika collaborated to maintain Soviet troops in Afghanistan with 
Andropov arguing at a Politburo Meeting in January of 1980 that the CPSU should not withdraw 
troops because the new regime needed time to grow more secure to political and military 
challenges.  The PDPA was inherently weak due to the Parcham-Khalq factionalism that 15
threatened the party unity. Even though the Parcham faction held power in the PDPA as 
KGB-pick for General Secretary Babrak Karmal was Parcham, the Khalq faction constituted the 
majority of the Afghan military. In a report to the CC CPSU in January, 1980, the troika and 
Ponomarev asserted that the CPSU should aid the PDPA through “the consistent implementation 
in Party life and Party construction of the line about the unity of the Party.”  At a Politburo 16
meeting in February, 1980, Andropov discussed his conversations with the Afghan leadership in 
which he “stressed the necessity of establishing genuine party unity,” liquidating the rift between 
the factions, and developing the preparedness of the army in order to stabilize the country and 
14 Kalinovsky, 64. 
15 Central Committee of the CPSU, Politburo, Politburo speaking for the Meeting on 17 January, 1980 (17 
January 1980); accessed on September 16, 2019.  ​https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//rus/Afganistan.html  
16 ​"CPSU CC Politburo Decision, with Report by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev, 27 
January 1980," January 28, 1980, Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenyi Arkhiv Noveistei Istorii (RGANI), f. 89, op. 
34, d. 3. Accessed through the Wilson Center Archive; accessed on September 15, 2020. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/11158​5  
17 
 ensure the PDPA’s power.  Defense Minister Ustinov stipulated that even though steps are 17
being taken to stabilize Afghanistan, “we can not even think about a withdrawal of troops,” and 
Brezhnev advocated for increasing Soviet forces in Afghanistan.  In another report in the 18
following April, the troika stated that “only when the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and the 
situation around the country improves, and only upon a request of the DRA leadership, may we 
consider the question of the eventual withdrawal of our troops from the DRA.”  As a result of 19
the concentration of decision-making power among the troika, Ponomarev and 
Aleksandrov-Agentov, there was little division within the party as old methods of silencing 
dissenters were still in practice. However, as the war progressed and factionalism in the PDPA 
increased, it soon became clear that the invasion was at the detriment of the Soviet Union and the 
party began to look for a way out.  
Even though the inner circle initially proceeded without much challenge, by June 1980 
stronger opposition within the Party, the military, and the academic world surfaced. Chernyaev 
detailed how intellectual advisors to the CPSU were increasingly unhappy with the situation in 
Afghanistan and the consequences it wrought for the Soviet Union. Notably, Georgy Arbatov, a 
director of the Academy of Sciences institutes who served as a political advisor to Brezhnev and 
Andropov expressed the damage the invasion caused the U.S.-Soviet relations.  Academian 20
17 ​"CC CPSU Politburo transcript (excerpt), On Andropov's Conversations with Afghan leaders," February 07, 1980, 
Wilson Center Archive, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, trans. by M. Doctoroff; accessed on September 16, 2019. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111587  
18 Ibid. 
19 ​"CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, with report by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and 
Zagladin, 7 April 1980," April 10, 1980, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, f. 3, op. 82, d. 
176, accessed through Wilson Center Archive, trans. by Svetlana Savranskaya; accessed on September 
16, 2019. ​https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111590  
20 “The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev: 1980,” accessed through the National Security Archive, trans. by 
Svetlana Savranskaya; accessed on September 16, 2019. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//rus/text_files/Chernyaev/1980.pdf 
18 
 Oleg Bogomolov sent the CC CPSU and the KGB his evaluation of the invasion, stating that the 
potential advantages of interference “turned out to be insignificant compared to the damage 
which was inflicted on our interests,” including the destruction of detente, the expansion of 
anti-Soviet movements in countries bordering the Union, and the “burden of economic aid.”  21
The members of the academic world were not the only group to criticize the intervention; the 
military also expressed worries. In a report from General Mayorov, General Maksimov, General 
Rodin and other military leaders to Ustinov, revealed reluctance to maintain military 
involvement as military efforts to defeat the counterrevolution and support the PDPA would be 
unproductive.  They noted that PDPA was more attentive to “achieving narrow factional goals 22
(removal of Khalqis)” in their resolution of problems and military concerns, negatively 
hampering the Party’s status.  Despite the military’s founded criticisms and evaluations, Ustinov 23
was able to exploit his position as Defense Minister to prevent the military’s concerns from 
reaching the Politburo. As a result of the inner circle’s successful suppression of dissenters, at 
the CPSU Central Committee Plenum in June 1980, the plenum followed suit after the Politburo 
and voted in full approval of the situation in Afghanistan and the argument necessitating the 
continued presence of Soviet troops.  24
In a private interview in July, 1980, deputy head of the International Department Vadim 
Zagladin described diverging opinions and arguments between the Central Committee and the 
21 ​"'Some Ideas About Foreign Policy Results of the 1970s (Points)' of Academician O. Bogomolov of the Institute of 
the Economy of the World Socialist System sent to the CC CPSU and the KGB," January 20, 1980, Wilson Center 
Archive, trans. by Gary Goldberg; accessed September 16, 2019. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111790  
22 ​"Report of Military Leaders to D. F. Ustinov," May 10, 1981,Wilson Center Archive, trans. by Gary Goldberg; 
accessed on September 16, 2019. ​https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113138  
23 Ibid. 
24 ​"Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Plenum on the situation in Afghanistan, 23 June 1980," June 23, 1980, 
RGANI, f. 89, op. 14, d. 40, accessed through Wilson Center Archive, accessed on September 16, 2019. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111594  
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 Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the Afghan problem. While he revealed that the Central 
Committee wanted to concentrate on the “normalization of the Afghan internal situation” i.e. the 
organization of the PDPA, Gromyko and others believed that the CPSU needed to act in a way 
“to defend the interests of strategy,” as the consequences of intervention brought high political 
and economic consequences to the Soviet Union.  25
By the end of 1981, a ​Pravda​ correspondent to the CC CPSU reported war efforts had 
resulted in “no significant changes in the situation from the summer of the last year.”  Due to 26
such costly stagnation, the inner circle was more favorable to diplomatic solutions. Although 
Ustinov was able to block pessimistic reports and positions from reaching the Politburo, as time 
went on, he grew aware of the pressing situation and became more sympathetic to concerns. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared, with Andropov’s and Ustinov’s support, a memorandum 
that the Politburo approved recommending proximity talks with Afghanistan and Pakistan to 
negotiate a ceasing of Pakistani support for the opposition Afghan forces, and the Soviet Union 
began working with the UN at the Geneva talks to reach a diplomatic solution. However, after 
Brezhnev’s death, his successor Andropov noted at a Politburo meeting “the negotiations with 
Pakistan in Geneva are moving slowly and with difficulty,” and he reminded the Politburo that 
they were “fighting against American imperialism” as the United States was supporting the 
25 ​"Memorandum of conversation between Vadim Zagladin of the CPSU CC and Gyula Horn, deputy head of the 
HSWP CC Foreign Department on debates inside the Soviet leadership on issues of international politics," July 16, 
1980, National Archives of Hungary (MOL), accessed through Wilson Center Archive, trans. by Attila Kolontari and 
Zsofia Zelnik; accessed on September 16, 2019. ​https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112496  
26 “Shchedrov’s letter on the ‘Situation in Afghanistan’ to the CC CPSU, November 12, 1981.” Trans.by 
Anna Melyakova. ​National Security Archive. ​2006. Accessed on September 16, 2019. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//rus/text_files/BrezhnevEpoch/1981.11.12%20Shchedrov%20Letter%20on%2
0Afghanistan.pdf 
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 mujahideen opposition forces.  Under Andropov, who assumed the role of General Secretary in 27
November 1982, no real progress towards solving the Afghan problem was negotiated nor 
drafted. There is very little documentation on policy-making towards Afghanistan under the 
succeeding Chernenko interregnum, from February 1984 to his death on March 10, 1985, as he 
was often ill and unable to attend Politburo meetings, and there were no other significant 
diplomatic initiatives. Documents and statements until 1982 revealed that Soviet party unity was 
intact under the leadership and control of the troika, even though there were rising anxieties 
surrounding the war.  A KGB report on the situation in the PDPA compiled in January 1983 
revealed how the persisting and increasing disagreements between the Parcham and Khalq 
factions had “taken over the armed forces and the government bureaucracy,” despite the Soviet 
Union’s efforts to stabilize the party.  Not only did the intra-party fights threaten the 28
government’s stability, but the KGB evaluated that the Afghan army’s level of combat training 
would not be able to stop the counterrevolutionary forces and stabilize the country.  Even 29
though the military felt strongly that military force would eventually be unproductive, the KGB 
wanted to maintain a military presence in efforts to normalize the situation as the PDPA would 
not survive on its own.  
 
 
27 ​"CPSU CC transcript of Politburo meeting (excerpt)," March 10, 1983, RGANI, f. 89 op. 42, d. 51, 
accessed through Wilson Center Archive, trans. by D. Rozas, accessed September 16, 2019. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111597  
28 ​"Excerpts from several reports about the situation in the PDPA compiled by the KGB," January 26, 1983, Wilson 
Center Archive, trans. by Gary Goldberg; accessed September 16, 2019. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113129  
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 Gorbachev's Decision to Scale Back the Soviet Presence and the Emergence of New 
Divisions within the Party (1985-1987) 
Upon Chernenko’s death, Gorbachev rose to fill the position of General Secretary, 
inheriting the puzzle of how to maintain Soviet prestige as a world power and as Communist 
leader in the world in the face of the Afghan war. During this time, Gromyko, new KGB chief 
Victor Chebrikov, and new Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov constituted the sitting Commision 
on Afghanistan. Gorbachev discussed the Afghan problem with military officials and other 
confidants, and the military commanders and detente-minded intellectuals expressed that there 
was no military solution to the war. At the Party Plenum in June 1985, Gorbachev replaced 
Gromyko and he nominated Shevardnazde to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs.  30
Shevardnazde’s nomination was a surprise and “indicative of the end of Gromyko’s 
monopoly...over foreign policy.”  Gorbachev also liquidated excessive committees, including 31
the one on Afghanistan, and he delegitimized Gromyko and other members who could hamper 
his ability to act “(almost absolutely) confidently and decisively.”  He also removed many of the 32
Brezhnev era members of the Politburo and the CC Secretariat. By 1988, only Ukrainian First 
Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitskii and Gromyko remained in office as the last remnants of the 
Brezhnev period in the Politburo.  In addition to these dismissals, unlike the Brezhnev and 33
Andropov periods, the early Gorbachev years allowed for more open discussion through his 
30 Central Committee of the CPSU, Politburo speaking for Questions of the Plenum of the CC CPSU (29 
June 1985) National Security Archive; accessed September 16, 2019. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc11.pdf 
31 “The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev: 1980,” accessed through the National Security Archive, trans. by 
Svetlana Savranskaya; accessed on September 16, 2019, 67. 
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB192/Chernyaev_Diary_translation_1985.pdf 
32 Chernyaev, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1985,” 35. 
33 William Maley, ​The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, ​15. 
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 policy of glasnost, in which debate within the party was encouraged, in contrast to the previously 
troika-dominated policies.  
With new dynamics in place within the Politburo, Gorbachev began to pursue careful 
policy-making on the Afghan situation. In March of 1985, Gorbachev informed Babrak Karmal, 
the newly installed General Secretary of the PDPA, that it was his responsibility “to ensure the 
genuinely irreversible character of the revolutionary process in Afghanistan” as the “Soviet 
troops cannot stay in Afghanistan forever.”  In the midst of trying to implement economic 34
reform through his policy of perestroika, Afghanistan was a “bleeding wound” to the Soviet 
economy.  Gromyko expressed that prolonged military engagement was a “to [America’s] 35
advantage” due to these costs.  However the demilitarization and disarmament efforts to 36
improve foreign relations with the west and to give the economy a fighting chance was met with 
resistance within the party. At a Politburo Session in June of 1985, Yegor Ligachev, the 
Secretary of Ideology, said that while the socialist world felt “the huge burden of military 
budgets, … this does not mean that we should weaken the country’s defense preparedness.”  On 37
October 17th, 1985, Gorbachev announced to the Politburo that he advised Karmal “to forget 
about socialism, share real power with the people who have real authority,” which included the 
34 Central Committee of the CPSU, M.S. Gorbachev, A.A. Gromyko and B. Karmal speaking for the 
Memorandum of Conversation 14 March, 1985 (14 March 1985). 
35 ​Minutes of Gorbachev's Meeting with CC CPSU Secretaries, March 15, 
1985​.​https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/index.htm 
36"CPSU CC Politburo Meeting Minutes (excerpt)," November 13, 1986, RGANI, f. 89, op. 42, d. 16, accessed 
through Wilson Center Archive, trans. by D. Rozas; accessed on September 16, 2019. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111599  
37 Session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU 29 June 1985, “on the practical implementation of and 
practical support for the results of the visit of Cde. Gorbachev M.S. to the UN,” 7. National Security 
Archive; accessed on September 16, 2019. ​https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc11.pdf 
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 militant opposition groups and far right Islamist groups.  Even though the Politburo approved 38
the decision to withdraw, there was no concrete plan in place.  
During the period from 1985 to early 1988, Soviet leaders pursued a new strategy, and 
they launched a national reconciliation policy to increase support of various parties and tribes for 
the Afghan government. A newly formed Afghanistan commission consisted of International 
Department head Anatoly Dobrynin, Marshal Sokolov, Shevardnazde and KGB Chairman Viktor 
Chebrikov. In efforts to expedite the Soviet withdrawal and disentangle the Soviet Union within 
Kabul, discussions about removing Karmal and replacing him with KGB-selected candidate 
Mohammad Najibullah emerged in 1986. Due to the previous heavy Soviet involvement in 
Afghan political affairs through military support and the influence of Soviet advisors, when the 
Party was discussing withdrawing from Afghanistan they were faced with the problem that 
“many members of the PDPA leaders [were] without initiative, and [had] gotten used to waiting 
for recommendations from our advisors.”  Unlike Karmal, his successor took initiative and was 39
willing to make independent decisions; however, “not a single member of the CC PDPA 
Politburo [supported] Najib.”  The Khalq-Parcham division worsened, and even though Karmal 40
and Najibullah were both of the Parcham faction, the majority of the PDPA was Khalqi. 
Additionally, Najibullah served as the head of the KhAD, which essentially was an Afghan KGB 
force that gathered evidence “in an effort to eliminate active as well as potential opponents and 
‘counterrevolutionaries’.”  Despite apparent obstacles to his leadership, in November 1986, the 41
38 Chernyaev, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1988,”  84. 
39"CPSU CC Politburo Meeting Minutes (excerpt)," November 13, 1986, RGANI, f. 89, op. 42, d. 16; accessed 
through Wilson Center Archive, trans. by D. Rozas; accessed on September 16, 2019. 
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111599​.  
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 CPSU Politburo supported the KGB and Afghanistan commission selected candidate 
Najibullah’s bid for power and encouraged Karmal to resign.  
In 1987, serious talks about withdrawal were underway, and at a February Politburo 
meeting Gorbachev, Shevardnazde and Gromyko supported withdrawing troops from 
Afghanistan and supplying material aid as an alternative. Gorbachev noted in agreement with 
Gromyko that material aid would likely not produce successful results in Afghanistan either, 
deploying additional troops would signify “the collapse of our whole cause [perestroika].”  42
However, he stipulated that the withdrawal should not be hasty as to appear that “we’re running 
away.”   By May 1987, General Varenikov reported to the Politburo that the efforts at national 43
reconciliation were failing, but Kryuchkov maintained that it was “impossible to withdraw, flee, 
and throw everything away.”  Marshal Akhromeev asserted in response that “a leading role for 44
the PDPA will never happen,” and to think contrary would “be an endless war.”   45
 
Withdrawal and Polarization within the Party (1988-1989) 
In 1988, Gorbachev brought in more like-minded reformers into the Politburo and pushed 
out conservatives, including Gromyko. Shevardnadze and Kryuchkov held control over Afghan 
affairs and policy-making. Marshal Akhromeev represented the military’s viewpoint and, on 
occasion, advisors like Anatoly Chernyaev or Alexander Yakovlev could appeal directly to 
Gorbachev. Colonel K. Tsagolov wrote a letter to Minister of Defense Dmitry Yazov, which was 
42 ​"Notes from Politburo Meeting, 26 February 1987 (Excerpt)," February 26, 1987, Wilson Center Archive, trans. by 
Gary Goldberg; accessed on September 16, 2019. ​https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117233  
43 ​Ibid. 
44 ​"Notes from Politburo Meeting, 21-22 May 1987 (Excerpt)," May 22, 1987, Wilson Center Archive, trans. by Gary 
Goldberg; accessed on September 16, 2019. ​https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117236  
45 Ibid.  
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 the first open critique of the Afghan war from the military establishment. In his letter, Tsagolov 
condemned efforts of national reconciliation to increase support for the PDPA, noting that the 
“huge material resources and considerable casualties did not produce a positive end result,” but 
instead Soviet efforts in Afghanistan are wasted on supporting the PDPA, which he asserted was 
“the main issue in the DRA” as “it was an artificial combination of two independent political 
tendencies ‘Khalq’ and ‘Parcham’.”  Tsagalov described how the Afghan armed forces also felt 46
a lack of confidence in its ability to defeat the counter-revolutionary forces as it suffered from 
increasing desertions, weak combat ability, and a lack of spurring ideology.  He suggested that 47
instead of pursuing the doomed national reconciliation, the leadership should instead reject “the 
framework of the old thinking, old approaches,” and instead “help the progressive political 
forces of the country,” even at the death of the PDPA.  Tsagalov’s criticism and suggestions 48
reflected the low morale the Soviet and Afghan military shared from the heavy losses and the 
desire for peace even at the expense of the PDPA. Even though the military favored a withdrawal 
regardless of if the PDPA was in crisis, the KGB did not want to allow the Pakistan and U.S. 
supported opposition forces to gain control of the DRA, knowing that the PDPA would not 
survive without direct Soviet involvement.  
  As the KGB-military rift worsened in the competition for influence on policy, they 
began to take sides with disputing factions of the PDPA with the KGB supporting the Parcham 
they installed to power in 1979 and the military supporting Khalq and the Khalq dominated DRA 
army they helped to train. This factionalism in the PDPA and the proxy-factionalism of the 
46 [from Alexander Lyakhovsky, The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan, Iskon, Moscow 1995, pp. 344-348], 
The National Security Archive, trans. by Svetlana Savranskaya; accessed on September 16, 2019. 
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 Soviet security apparatus created camps within the Party over Afghan policy. On the one hand, 
the Najibullah lobby and Gorbachev did not support a hasty withdrawal, and they wanted to 
secure Najibullah’s position and Soviet interests. The other camp composed of the military and 
pro-withdrawal party members acknowledged that the national reconciliation efforts to gain 
support for the PDPA were not effective, and they hoped that the PDPA would form a coalition 
government with opposition movements. Georgii Kornienko, deputy director of the International 
Department, and Akhromeev pursued efforts to push Najibullah to make peace with leaders of 
opposition movements, but when Shevardnazde told Gorbachev they were not following party 
line, Gorbachev removed them from the Afghanistan commission as a result.  Their removal 49
from Afghan affairs silenced the main voices for solutions to the Afghan problem that excluded 
Najibullah. Gorbachev spoke in support of this as he expressed “We must carry out the line of 
the Politburo and not adapt it to individuals in the General Staff or the working group.”  50
Shevardnazde and the KGB were able to hold Gorbachev’s ear, echoing the workings of 
the Brezhnev era, as their arguments reflected Gorbachev's concerns over saving face and 
preserving Soviet prestige. However, by 1989 as withdrawal was near completion, Gorbachev 
turned towards the policy-making advice of the military. During the withdrawal, Najibullah 
begged for the troops to stay as he knew his rule was threatened in the absence of the Soviet 
military. In January of 1989, Najibullah communicated with Shevardnazde over sending in a 
brigade of Soviet troops, a plan to which Shevardnazde agreed. Yakovlev called Chernyaev to 
tell him about Shevardnadze’s proposal and what they should do. Chernyaev responded with “Is 
[Shevardnadze] crazy, or does he not understand that Najibullah is setting a trap so we can’t 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid.  
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 leave in order to cause us to clash with the Americans and the rest of the world?... [This 
operation] would take even more of our boys’ lives.”  Chernyaev called Gorbachev and a 51
Yakovlev-Cheryaev-Shervardnadze debate broke out in which Gorbachev sided with the former 
two. Gorbachev reasoned that the Soviets should not “create the impression of running away” 
from the third world, but that they should find a method to help without sending in more troops– 
“a slap in [Shevardnazde’s] face.”  These incidents revealed the growing factionalism between 52
KGB-aligned party members and Soviet military-aligned members over withdrawal policies 
denoting the USSR’s continued role in Afghanistan. As the KGB and like-minded members 
urged continued Soviet support and presence in order to preserve the PDPA and the Soviet 
prestige as a socialist leader, the military and other members did not want to waste any more 
lives or money into Soviet Union’s bleeding wound.  
Another debate surrounding the Soviet withdrawal occurred in March after Najibullah 
asked for Soviet help again, this time in the form of bomb air-raids, otherwise the PDA 
government would collapse. Shevardnadze again supported Najibullah, and he enlisted the 
support of Kryuchkov, Secretary Lev Zaikov and General Yazov. Gorbachev held a Politburo 
meeting on March 11 to discuss the situation, in which Shevardnazde argued “we cannot act 
otherwise [than to conduct an air-raid], it would be a betrayal, we promised, we are forsaking our 
friends...what will the third world say...” and Kryuchkov supported his position.  Yakovlev 53
countered by saying “from a military point of view it is a waste of time,” and that Najibullah has 
an army and guard large enough for effective defense.  He furthered his argument in saying “it 54
51 Chernyaev, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1989,” 5. 
52 Chernyaev, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1989,”  6.  
53 Chernyaev, 1989, 10. 
54 Ibid. 
28 
 took us so much work to win international confidence … are we going to flush it down the drain 
by this single action? And for what?! Our people are just beginning to slowly recover from 
Afghanistan.”  Belorussian First Secretary Nikolai Slyunkov, Secretary Victor Nikonov, 55
Secretary Vadim Medvedev, Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov and Gorbachev supported 
Yakovlev’s stance against the air-raids. After this incident, apart from offering financial support, 
the Soviet Union left Afghanistan to its own devices in accordance with the Geneva meetings, 
and signaled to the world the end of Soviet expansionism.  
 
Conclusion 
The Afghan war weakened party unity as it provoked ideological questions challenging 
the identity of the Soviet Union, and as it created and increased divisions within the party as 
factionalism within the PDPA was reflected in the CPSU.  Withdrawal held the ramifications of 
signaling the end of Soviet expansionism, a moving away from the traditional party line in 
support of the international proletariat, and harming Soviet prestige as a leader of the Soviet 
world. At the inception of the war, party unity was relatively strong as policy-making was 
concentrated in the hands of a few key policy makers with close ties to the General Secretary and 
dissenters were silenced, pushing the remaining Politburo members to reach consensus in 
support of the policies. However, as the war progressed creating international and economic 
consequences, and after Gorbachev reorganized the dynamics of the party and introduced 
glasnost, weaknesses in party unity emerged. Even though Gorbachev encouraged debate, he 
retired most of the party members who served under Brezhnev, reduced his staff to one-third of 
55 Ibid. 
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 its original number, and he dissolved a number of committees. As the withdrawal process neared, 
salient divisions emerged within the party.  Shevardnazde held the position that complete Soviet 
withdrawal and the abandonment of Kajibullah was a betrayal to the party line. Gorbachev and 
the KGB were wary of a withdrawal because it would allow for other powers, such as the United 
States, to gain influence in the region of economic interest to the USSR, and it would weaken 
Soviet prestige. The factionalism in the PDPA became a battleground for the disputing Soviet 
camps as the military and pro-withdrawal party members worked with Khalq and the Afghan to 
pursue other alternatives to Najibullah, opposing the KGB and Shevardnazde in support of 
Najibullah.  Initially the pro-Najibullah camp had Gorbachev’s ear as it consisted of the KGB 
and like-minded reformists; however, as the war went on, the casualties rose and more money 
was lost to this bleeding wound. The Soviet army had little gains, and with domestic Soviet 
opinion on the war soured, the war soon felt too costly to continue. Gorbachev’s fears and the 
ideology of theNajibullah lobby were incompatible with the reality of the situation which the 
military viewed less favorably. Therefore, the Afghan war worsened the existing KGB-military 
rift, and it also created salient division among the Najibullah Lobby and its opposition within the 
CPSU.  
In the Afghan situation, not only does the Soviet economy worsen, but the rise of the 
mujahideen and nationalist sentiments within Afghanistan emerged to challenge the 
revolutionary government in place. Despite the military budget cuts to spur the initiatives of 
perestroika, the economy was still unable to perform well due to the lasting consequences the 
military-industrial complex had on economic growth. Thus, the Afghan war not only damaged 
30 
 party unity through weakening the USSR’s international position, but it also contributed to future 
economic woes that furthered the dissolution in party unity. 
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 Chapter II Economic Woes and Party Unity 
Various leaders throughout Soviet history have sought to contend with the weak, slowing 
economy through enterprise measures to stimulate economic growth while maintaining 
centralized economic control. In October, 1921, Lenin described the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) he imagined for the Soviet Union. The NEP included privatization measures, and even 
though Lenin admitted these measures were capitalist in nature, he contended with capitalism 
urging ​“there must be collective discussion, but individual responsibility.”  Under Stalin, the 56
Soviet Union abandoned the NEP in favor of rapid industrialization and collectivization, which 
resulted in great, however short-term, economic growth. As the economic boom under Stalin 
slowed down, Krushschev sought to devolve economic power concentrated in the center to a 
more local level and to increase local accountability through tying bonuses to enterprise 
profitability. When Brezhnev rose to power, under the leadership of his Second Secretary, 
Aleksei Kosygin, they sought to extend Krushchev’s initiatives and to implement a “socialist 
market” that encouraged production and efficiency through private enterprise, but his economic 
reforms ultimately failed because of the entrenched hierarchical nature of the Soviet system and 
the difficulty in devolving authority.   57
When Gorbachev inherited this failing economy struggling under a poorly-planned 
bureaucratic system, corruption, waste, and heavy investment in the defense industry at the 
expense of civilian and development sectors, he imagined a radical solution which was his 
economic policy, perestroika. Despite offering a dramatic restructuring of the Soviet economy, 
56 Vladimir Lenin, “The New Economic Policy and The Tasks of the Political Education Departments,” 
Translated by David Skvirsky and George Hanna, ​Lenin’s Collected Works, ​Progress Publishers 
(Moscow, 1965), vol 33, 60-79. ​https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1921/oct/17.htm 
57 Moshe Lewin, ​The Gorbachev Phenomenon: Expanded Edition ​(University of California Press, 1991), 
2. 
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 essentially perestroika resembled the feeble, market-inspired effort to encourage enterprise as an 
economic stimulus that many of Gorbachev’s predecessors had attempted. Stalin maintained 
Party unity through his totalitarian control, violently silencing voices of opposition to his 
economic policy. Due to division between Party members who wanted to maintain the same 
command-control economy versus Krushchev’s economic reforms to incentivize productivity 
and consumer goods, Brezhnev staged a coup against Khrushchev in 1964, thus maintaining 
Party unity through a show of force. However, during the Gorbachev years, the same 
disagreements that were present during Krushchev’s economic reforms emerged, and because 
they were encouraged under Gorbachev, they could not be overcome to the detriment of party 
unity.  
In 1986, Gorbachev began perestroika​ ​with efforts to improve economic performance. 
His new vision for the economy was based upon market principles such as private enterprise to 
encourage competition and the investment in civilian and technology sectors to stimulate growth. 
Additionally, Gorbachev hoped that with restructuring the bureaucratic apparatus to streamline 
communication and to create distinct divisions he would be able to improve the state’s efficiency 
and further facilitate improved economic performance. However, the cooperatives movement 
sparked debate over its cohesiveness with socialist ideology and pre-existing institutions, and it 
incited concerns over the future of the defense sector and the rise of nationalist movements in the 
face of economic chaos. Soon divisions in the party between conservatives, who supported the 
command-economy and traditional socialist economic principles, in opposition to market 
liberals, who supported reforms such as economic cooperatives, over the economic reforms. 
Conservatives including military members, the KGB and Party members who profited from the 
33 
 entrenched power relation of the center resented and even feared the reforms, and they sought to 
slow or end its process.  In opposition, reformists, including reform-minded individuals who 
Gorbachev installed after the party purge of Brezhnevian officials, urged a faster pace of 
implementing the reforms. The leadership’s lack of complete and unified commitment to the 
reform process, the unwillingness of workers and officials to embrace private enterprise and 
increased economic accountability, and the ideologically contradictory reforms resulted in 
abysmal economic performance and growing anxieties surrounding the cooperative movement. 
These anxieties further cemented divisions in the party and a breakdown in party unity.  
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 Analysis 
Table 2. Factions of Economic Reform Policy 
Maintain centralized 
control over the economy 
Allow limited free markets 
to co-exist with the planned 
economy (co-ops, etc.) 
Full transition to market 
economy 
Yegor Ligachev– Secretary of 
Ideology (1985-88), Secretary 
of Agriculture (1988-90)  
Mikhail Gorbachev– General 
Secretary of the CPSU 
(1985-91) 
Boris Yeltsin– First Secretary 
CPSU Moscow City 
Committee, CC Secretary for 
Construction  
Gosplan (State Planning 
Committee) 
Nikolai Ryzhkov–  Chairman 
of Council of Ministers 
(1985-90) 
Alexander Yakovlev– Head 
of CPSU Propaganda 
Department (1985-86); Full 
Politburo member, ideology 
department (1987-90)  
KGB, Soviet Military   
 
The Birth of Perestroika and The Emergence of Resistance (1985-1987) 
After Gorbachev assumed the role of General Secretary, he began to call for widespread 
reform of the economy through introducing market mechanisms to increase the autonomy and 
responsibility of individuals at the production level and through restructuring the 
bureaucratic-economic apparatus. In a speech to the Central Committee, Gorbachev outlined his 
economic plan: “While strengthening centralized planning in the main areas, we propose to 
continue to expand the rights of enterprises, to introduce genuine economic accountability,” 
which can be achieved through “the proper delineation of the rights and duties of each level of 
management.”  With an understanding that radical economic reform would face resistance 58
within the party, Gorbachev retired and replaced many Brezhnev-era members of the Central 
Committee, resulting in 41% of new full members to the Politburo and “an almost complete 
58  “Gorbachev Spurs Drive to Update Economy,” ​Pravda, ​April 12,1985,1-2.  
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 turnover of department chiefs in place when Brezhnev died in 1982.”  At the 27th Party 59
Congress on March 6, 1986, “the Congress strongly endorsed Gorbachev’s economic strategy,” 
and even the conservatives appeared to be on board, as conservative Ukrainian party boss 
Shcherbitskii indicated when he revised his hardline position against reform to support 
Gorbachev’s proposals.  Therefore, following the Congress, the new, more reform-minded 60
leadership initially appeared capable of bringing reform to the failing Soviet economy. 
In December of 1986, the first signs of resistance to perestroika came from 
reform-minded, yet reserved Yegor Ligachev, the Party secretary in charge of ideology. 
Gorbachev’s close advisor Anatoly Chernyaev detailed in his diary an argument that occurred 
when Ligachev spoke out against Gorbachev at the Politburo over perestroika and the destruction 
of social state norms. Chernyaev recorded that Ligachev argued the reforms of economic 
accountability and enterprise hurt those reliant upon the state such as the retired, poor, disabled 
and even students. Only Premier Ryzhkov supported Gorbachev, while RSFSR Premier Vitalii 
Vorotnikov, Control Committee chief Mikhail Solomentsev and Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevarnadze were sympathetic to Ligachev’s position.  This recorded instance revealed growing 61
attitudinal resistance to the reform policies, and how Ligachev and other Politburo members 
perceived the Soviet population’s potential anxieties surrounding enterprise initiatives, even if 
these policies were meant to improve the profitability of state enterprises.  
59 ​"CIA Intelligence Assessment, 'The 27th CPSU Congress: Gorbachev’s Unfinished Business'," April, 1986, 
accessed through CIA Archive; accessed September 16, 2019. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/19860401A.pdf​ 5-7. 
60 ​Ibid. 
61 Anatoly Chernyaev, “The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1986.” Translated by Anna Melyakova. Edited 
by Svetlana Savranskaya.  ​National Security Archive. ​2006, 27. 
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 In addition to attitudinal resistance, ideological debates surrounding the discrepancies 
between perestroika and traditional Party economy emerged. Secretary Aleksander Yakovlev, 
known as the Father of Perestroika, attempted to address the growing ideological strife 
surrounding perestroika in his presentation to the Politburo on September 28, 1987. He conceded 
that “perestroika has brought up the issue of democratization” and is seemingly contradictory to 
ideological values.  Democratization also posed a threat to the entrenched power of party 62
members and the perks they enjoyed with their membership, both of which greatly rattled the 
more conservative elements of the Party. Yakovlev noted that conservatism had hindered the 
path and implementation of perestroika and that it was incompatible “to live in a new way, and to 
work in the old way.”  Yakovlev urged the party to embrace the reforms because halfway 63
measures would result in the failure of the economic reforms. However, the public was also 
skeptical towards the ideological contradictions present in perestroika. In particular, the 
“Pamyat” organization, which was a reactionary conservative movement to protect Russian 
heritage, distributed flyers crying “Stop Yakovlev!,” presenting Yakovlev “as the main threat to 
all the Russian sacred things.”  Chernyaev asserted that Pamyat had Ligachev’s and 64
Vorotnikov’s direct support, and Yakovlev speculated that Chebrikov also played a role in the 
creation of the flyer.  These instances revealed growing attitudinal resistance to the reformist 65
economic policy within the party, and it showed the beginning of polarization between reformists 
62 Text of presentation at the CC CPSU Politburo Session September 28, 1987. National Security Archive; 
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 and conservatives over ideological concerns arising from personal enterprise with conservatives 
supporting the traditional command economy in opposition to market reforms.  
However, the economic reforms not only faced ideological barriers that hindered full 
implementation, but also concerns from military and KGB officials who had strong reservations 
for economic reform.  The security apparatus strongly favored the traditional command 
economic system because it required a strong center to maintain control over the economic 
practices and production throughout the Union. As part of the democratic initiative in 
perestroika, the military and KGB were no longer employed as forces of coercion to ensure that 
individuals and officials complied with the reform measures. Not only did the security apparatus 
dislike being on a shorter leash, but also it strongly opposed any whiff of capitalism, which they 
detected in the air surrounding economic reform.  In a meeting on security concerns, the head of 
the KGB’s Fifth Chief Directorate Abramov, discussed how ‘self-initiative’ and the rise of 
organizations and groups during the time of economic and social freedom are “directly affecting 
our [KGB] operations.”  He stated that the KGB had a document from the U.S. Embassy in 66
Moscow “to use these informal associations for infiltrating the party, state, and societal 
apparatus.”  The security apparatus’s position on the market reforms soured due to security 67
concerns stemming from less centralized control of the economy at local levels, the potential 
encroachment of capitalism, and their loss of power due to increased reliance on market 
principles rather than coercion.  
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 Restructuring, The Law on Cooperatives, and Polarization within The Party (1988) 
The year 1988 marked the beginning of increasingly radical economic reforms and 
drastic restructuring of the economic apparatus. The increased magnitude of reform created 
greater polarization within the party due to ideological, security-related, and institutional 
disagreements, creating clear conservative and reformist camps fighting for political influence of 
the economic future. On February 18, 1988, the CPSU Central Committee Plenum supported 
Gorbachev's speech calling for restructuring ideology to support the initiatives of perestroika and 
economic reform. Despite this win for perestroika, within the party “there [was] not even an idea 
of how to tune the economic mechanism to work on the new principles,” and in the meantime, 
the economy worsened with production falling and market supplies decreasing.  In response to 68
this growing uncertainty felt within the public and the party, Gorbachev’s objective was to be 
more assertive and create a commodity-market mechanism and to have laws governing the 
economy rather than people.  In May, 1988, the state adopted the Law on Co-operatives, 69
allowing private enterprise. Not only were cooperatives meant to stimulate economic growth at 
the individual level, but also encouraging individual enterprise “brought many phenomena of the 
shadow economy out into the open and legalized them, allowing the state to collect taxes on 
formerly underground income and profits.”  However, the encouragement of legalized private 70
enterprise contradicted traditional party ideology, and even Gorbachev pondered at a Politburo 
meeting “how to combine democracy, glasnost with a strong, central power.”   71
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 Soon officials and the public perceived “a mass of problems [arising] connected with the 
cooperatives,” such as price increases.  By November, 1988, the media reported “blatant 72
hostility toward members of cooperatives on the party of a portion of the public and, most 
important, of officials in positions of power is a complaint shared by almost everyone.”  At a 73
December Politburo meeting, Ligachev stated that cooperatives were a deviation from the 
traditional party line and a threat to the command economy.  Local Soviet executive committees 74
placed limitations on cooperatives to diminish their economic freedom through limiting the 
amounts of goods cooperatives could purchase. In a debate reported in ​Izvestia, ​party 
conservative Protsenko supported such limitations, while reform-minded Usov was opposed to 
these measures. Protsenko argued that cooperatives were purchasing a large portion of already 
scarce foodstuffs and resources and reselling them at higher prices. Usov countered that these 
restrictions showed “that the local authorities do not want to recognize the cooperatives as equal 
partners with the state sector.”  According to a CIA report, “ideological concerns and 75
bureaucratic resistance have limited the scale of the program significantly.”  These incidents 76
revealed widespread attitudinal barriers to the cooperative movement from party officials, to 
local officials, and within the general public.  
In addition to introducing radical economic reform, Gorbachev proceeded with dramatic 
restructuring of the party apparatus to aid the reform process through greatly reducing the 
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 number of departments and weakening the Secretariat, which Ligachev previously headed. 
Chernyaev recorded that Gorbachev, who was now President as well as head of the Party, retired 
party conservatives Gromyko, Dobrynin, and Solomentsev.  He demoted Ligachev to head the 77
agriculture division, and Chebrikov was now the head of the commision on legal issues.  In 78
sum, “by shrinking the size of the Secretariat, Gorbachev has decreased the representation of 
several economic departments,” thereby further consolidating and centralizing the economic 
responsibility.  Despite the efforts at restructuring the apparatus to better implement economic 79
reform, there was ambiguity of responsibilities within the new apparatus and vagueness about 
how the new apparatus was to implement perestroika. The cooperative movement and market 
reforms were inherently incompatible with a command economy because the law of supply and 
demand governing cooperatives did not serve as regulator of the central economy.  Due to these 
fundamentally different principles on which these levels of the economy functioned, it was 
fruitless to try to find a middle ground for the economy to operate effectively. As a result, the 
party further polarized over economic policy with conservative forces in favor of a return to a 
stronger command economy in opposition to reformists desire for a more complete transition 
into a market economy.  
 
Growing Unrest and the Failure of Perestroika (1989-1990) 
By 1989, after little returns from the cooperative movement, skepticism spread and 
dissent developed within the party. Gorbachev felt frustrated towards the heel-dragging of party 
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 conservatives who hindered the reforms, and in January of 1989, he announced that economic 
reform was far from complete due to the strong “inertia of old ways,” and the “ministries’ and 
central economic departments’ fear of losing control over the movement of material resources.”  80
In a speech, Gorbachev addressed the restive public in the face of continued food shortages and 
price increases acknowledging “restructuring has come down hard on some people’s personal 
interests,” including staffs of ministries and agencies where restructuring is underway.  In the 81
face of ideological strife and the question of the abandonment of socialist values, Gorbachev 
stated, “we have work to do on the philosophical and political principles of our society’s 
renewal.”  In February, this similar dialogue continued, with Gorbachev stating “the current 82
debate disturbs me… some people are already starting to show nostalgia for ‘the good old 
days.’”  In May, 1989 at a Speech to Congress, Gorbachev again chided members trying to 83
hinder the economic reform process and even trying to sabotage the transition, revealing 
persistent, salient division within the party.  In the following September, Gorbachev discussed 84
divisions between the reformists versus traditionally-minded conservatives, and how the former 
is too radical and wants too much change too fast while the latter is trying to stop perestroika 
from succeeding.  He addressed the “stormy process of transforming and breaking with outdated 85
forms of social life and stereotypes from the past” impeding private property and the multiparty 
system through urging that “we must continue elaborating the concept of a new face of 
socialism.”   86
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 Party conservatives such as Ligachev exploited these concerns on party ideology and 
economic reform “playing on fears of instability to weaken Gorbachev.”  According to a report 87
from the CIA in April, 1989, large parts of the Central Committee, the party apparatus, the 
military and the KGB threatened economic reform.  Even though Gorbachev urged developing a 88
new face of socialism, the party faced a crisis of legitimacy as the reforms appeared to be a 
rejection of communism, and “so far the regime [had] not developed an effective legitimizing 
myth to replace the one it [was] destroying.”  In response to the ideological issues and the 89
contradiction between the economic reforms and socialism, Gorbachev again argued that “we 
more and more often run into the inertia of old thinking, into a desire to resort to old methods, to 
slow down the processes that are underway. This is where the contradiction arises!”  However, 90
despite Gorbachev’s efforts to create a new version of socialism compatible with the economic 
reforms, a report from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow aptly reported that “Leninism in effect 
becomes what the current leaders want it to be” and “ideologically-based guarantees of social 
equity may have to give ground to market-based efficiencies.”   91
 The economic reform process had stagnated and the economic state of the Soviet Union 
only worsened in 1990. According to an article in the ​New York Times ​in March, economic 
experts stated that the reforms were “‘half-hearted,’ and entrepreneurs [had] still not been given 
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 authority to run their enterprises efficiently.”  Nikolai Tikhonov, the President of the Union of 92
Cooperatives, said the Soviet economy was ‘falling apart.’ Gorbachev called a Politburo meeting 
in September in an effort to hasten the economic transition to a market economy, but again the 
stubbornness of the conservatives stunted his efforts. Eventually, perestroika was abandoned in 
the subsequent years, and the Communist Party no longer served as the leading force in the 
country. The attempted transition to a market economy in efforts to save the failing Soviet 
economy was met with staunch resistance from party conservatives such as Ligachev, members 
of the Secretariat, as well as members of the KGB and military that severely impaired the 
economic reform efforts resulting in halfway measures that were doomed to fail.  
 
Conclusion  
The dissonance surrounding the institutional barriers within the party apparatus and 
ideological contradictions between socialism and market initiatives such as the cooperatives 
movement fueled polarization within the party between reformists and party conservatives, 
resulting in a lack of consensus that led to economic failure and a loss of party power.  At the 
beginning of Gorbachev’s administration, there was a general consensus that something must be 
done to improve the struggling economy. Following the largest purging of party members since 
before Khrushchev, Gorbachev appeared to have the power and support to implement radical 
economic reform.  As time went on, polarization within the party emerged from the ambiguity 
surrounding perestroika, the departure from the traditional command economy, and subsequent 
security concerns. Conservatives viewed the cooperatives movement in direct contradiction to 
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 socialist values of a command economy because they felt that private enterprise was in line with 
capitalist thought. Not only were there these conservative attitudinal and ideological barriers, but 
the cooperatives did not function well in the continued centralization of the economy. As a result 
of the institutional hurdles and the conservatives efforts to delay or stunt the reforms, the 
economy worsened and the polarization within the party widened. Therefore, the economic 
reforms and attempted transition to a market economy amidst worsening economic performance 
weakened party unity, leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
With the increased economic turmoil, nationalist groups were able to use this confusion 
and fear to fuel their movements. Additionally, disillusioned with perestroika’s economic 
returns,  various Soviet republics sought greater economic autonomy and began to push for 
independence or greater political autonomy. The rising nationalist disintegration amid struggling 
efforts of restructuring added to the Party’s anxieties and concerns, intensifying polarization 
within the Party, and threatening the future of the Union.  
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 Chapter III Nationalist Disintegration and Party Unity 
Introduction 
The potential volatility of ethnic nationalism to the Soviet system had been a present 
concern since the Russian Revolution, threatening Lenin’s and the Bolshevik’s ultimate goal of 
the voluntary merging of nations to create one large socialist state. Lenin and Stalin opposed 
federalism and the principles of extraterritorial and territorial national cultural autonomy, which 
respectively describe the representation of each nationality in parliament and the ethnic 
definition of autonomous territory.  However, after the revolution, in order to convince states 93
desiring independence to join the Union, the Soviet state became ethnically defined political 
units and was theoretically federative in nature. Ronald Suny, noted that “both federalism and 
national-territorial autonomy were written into the first Soviet constitution” of 1918.  After the 94
Russian Civil War (November 1917- October 1922), the Baltic States were some of the few 
states to remain independent after the war. During the 1930s, Lenin with support from Stalin 
encouraged the “nativization” policy, which supported native languages, created a national 
political elite and intelligentsia, and “formally [institutionalized] ethnicity in the state apparatus.” 
Stalin opposed this encouragement of ethnic culture and identity, and when he rose to 
power, his industrialization efforts greatly sidelined these cultural initiatives. The centralized 
command economy caused a decrease in republic autonomy and subordinated the ethnic interests 
to Russian language and culture. “Russian language study was compulsory in all schools” by the 
end of the 1930s, and only party officials or economic managers who were literate in Russian 
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 and Russian culture were chosen as cadres.  It soon became clear that Stalin and party leaders 95
preserved the tsarist imperialists relationship between the center and the peripheries under the 
guise of a supranational ideology sanctioning Communist party rule. Despite enjoying decades of 
independence, during WWII, Stalin annexed the Baltic states in June of 1940 under the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.  Not only were the Baltics states demographically securely national 96
with over 75% of Latvians in Latvia and around 85% of Estonians and Lithuanians within their 
titulars at the time of annexation, but the memory of their independent rule would mobilize the 
Baltic peoples during Gorbachev’s years. Through simultaneously eliminating the nationalities’ 
political sovereignty while guaranteeing territorial identity, encouraging national language and 
culture, and promoting native cadres to power, the Soviet Union became a collection of national 
identities rather than the unified melting pot as Leninist thought desired. Stalin’s forced 
Russification and imposed modernization policy greatly threatened nationalist identity under the 
pressures of assimilation, and this created a catalyst for the Soviet Union’s destruction following 
the weakening of central power upon Stalin’s death.  
During the post-Stalin period, the center’s control decreased, allowing regional and 
ethnic communist parties a greater degree of independence. During the Khrushchev and 
Brezhnev years, the center permitted greater nationalists expressions, and this provided 
republican leaders the opportunity to grow in power even as the ultimate power still remained in 
Moscow. The republics soon fell under the rule of national “mafias,” and by the 1970s, due to 
the longevity of the “mafias” tenure in power, local elites were able to consolidate power and 
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 placate “the local populations with moderate concessions to nationalist feelings and a high 
degree of economic permissiveness.”  As the Soviet economy stagnated, Brezhnev sought to 97
dismantle the mafia network that hindered his economic plans, but the networks persisted and 
became a form of national resistance to central authority.  
However, the pivotal moment in history that unleashed these nationalist movements was 
Gorbachev’s restructuring of the Party apparatus. Through encouraging democratic rule and 
glasnost, Gorbachev weakened the power of the republican Communist parties in the Baltics, and 
he delegitimized the Communist Party rule at the center.  These nationalist movements further 98
damaged party unity, as party members could not agree upon a policy to preserve the Union, 
even as the sovereignty of the Communist party and the Soviet Union dissolved. Party 
conservatives in Moscow did not want the republics to gain independence, and they advocated 
for a show of force to curtail the demonstrations. The KGB and Soviet military also opposed 
these movements, and felt that if the Baltic republics became independent, they would reach out 
to the West, especially since they were politically oriented towards the West before their 
annexation. The reformists did not want the republics to separate from the Union, but they were 
against force because it would be the end of perestroika’s democratic initiative. As the Union 
began to fall apart due to the increasing demands of the popular movements in the Baltics, the 
sides grew increasingly divided on whether to address these movements with force or with 
concessions. 
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 Analysis 
Table 3. Factions of Nationalist Disintegration Containment Policy  
Pursue a concessionist policy to maintain 
the Union 
Employ coercive force in the Republics to 
maintain the Union 
Mikhail Gorbachev– General Secretary of the 
CPSU (1985-91) 
Soviet Army, KGB, Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 
Alexander Yakovlev– Head of CPSU 
Propaganda Department (1985-86); Full 
Politburo member, Senior Secretary 
(1987-90)  
Yegor Ligachev– Secretary of Ideology 
(1985-88), Secretary of Agriculture (1988-90)  
Vadim Medvedev– Secretary for Ideology 
(1988-90) 
Victor Chebrikov– KGB chairman (1982-88) 
Bogomolov Commission Dmitry Yazov– Marshal and Minister of 
Defense  
 
Perestroika and the Rise of Nationalist Sentiments in the Baltics (1985-1988) 
Even from the beginning of his stint as General Secretary, Gorbachev understood the 
significance of the Soviet Union’s ethnic and national diversity to the survival of the union. 
When Gorbachev began to replace and retire most of the Old Guard, he was thoughtful of his 
new appointees. At a June, 1985 Politburo session only months into his new leadership position, 
he appointed Eduard Shevardnazde, the first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party and an 
ethnic Georgian, to Minister of Foreign Affairs, not only because he shared reformists 
sentiments, but also as Gorbachev stated: “we have to have one more consideration in mind–that 
we have a multinational country, and it is important that it finds its reflection in the composition 
of the central party organs.”  In other words, Gorbachev understood the importance of having 99
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 people from the Soviet republics reflected in the membership of the Politburo to represent the 
sharing of central power with the republics. Similarly, as the Latvians had created a mass popular 
front by the fall of 1988, Gorbachev appointed Boris Pugo, the first secretary of the Latvian 
Communist Party, to serve as the chairman of the Party Control Committee in September, 1988. 
Pugo later became the Minister of Internal Affairs in December of 1990.  
As perestroika developed not only as a restructuring of the economy but also the political 
apparatus, the rigidity of old structures gave way, allowing nationalistic rustlings in the republics 
in the form of People’s Fronts to emerge in the Baltics. According to a CIA report in April, 1986, 
“the congress speeches reflected concern about nationalism and localism” with Secretary of 
Ideology Ligachev and Politburo member Victor Mishin having a “faint tone of Russian 
nationalism” in their remarks.  Conservatives were beginning to show concern over the 100
possible consequences of perestroika and glasnost, fearing that the increased level of individual 
freedoms and democracy would erode the Party’s influence and the Union’s authority. At an 
August 1988 session of the Politburo, members “stressed the unacceptability of any attempts to 
use democracy and openness for antidemocratic goals to discredit our common internationalist 
achievements and to sow discord among nationalities.”  Conservatives and reformists alike 101
were cautious of the potential threat democracy presented to the Soviet Union’s center as the 
diffusion of power could allow groups to mobilize and challenge Moscow’s authority. Ligachev 
and Chebrikov were the most vocal conservatives arguing that “glasnost and democratization 
have contributed significantly to the growing assertiveness of non-Russian ethnic groups,” and 
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 they urged that the leadership curtail the growing unrest.  Yakovlev argued in favor of allowing 102
concessions to the movements, insisting that “the authoritarian policies of the past are principally 
responsible for the nationalist ferment.”   103
Pravda ​published a telling article in the following September that gave subsistence to 
party conservatives’ arguments against reform. According to the article discussing the Estonian 
People’s Front, the conditions of perestroika and glasnost “made it possible [for the People’s 
Front] to consolidate a large part of the population” for nationalist goals, confirming 
conservative fears.   The movement’s goal was “to restore state independence … sovereignty of 104
the republic. … They do not believe that a super-centralized Union state can be turned into a 
union of sovereign states.”  Although the Party collectively was opposed to notions of 105
independence, the conservatives desired a military solution to reinforce the authority of the 
Union. The reformists did not support independence, but they understood that encouraging 
individual accountability and free speech would incite extreme sentiments as a byproduct of 
reform. Instead of using force, the reformists endorsed a concessionist policy, hoping to settle the 
angst of nationalist movements through appeasement. According to a CIA Intelligence 
Assessment, the party was split on how to handle the growing unrest in the republics: 
Before the September plenum, the leadership appeared to have reached a consensus on 
the need for a show of force to restore order in the Caucasus. At the same time, Politburo 
reformers seemed to give the green light to authorities in the Baltic states to allow 
extraordinarily large –and peaceful–demonstrations on behalf of greater regional 
autonomy, and to permit indigenous ‘popular fronts’ to organize actively.  106
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This assessment revealed the disunity within the Party on how to handle these nationalist 
movements, resulting in inconsistent responses that further delegitimized the Communist Party’s 
role as the central power.  
In October, 1988, Gorbachev’s reform-minded aid and political advisor Georgy 
Shakhnazarov, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, reflected shared concerns over 
calls for independence, as he urged that “we cannot renounce the role of a leader, the role that 
will always objectively belong to the Soviet Union as the most powerful socialist country.”  107
Despite the desire to remain in a position of authority, Shakhnazarov advised in favor of 
reformists that Soviet leadership should not employ the military to diffuse future “crisis 
situations” as it would harm the initiatives of perestroika.   108
In November, the new Ideology chairman Medvedev, Socio-economic Policy 
Commission chairman Slyunkov and KGB chairman Chebrikov returned from the Baltics and 
described how they were assailed with “‘Russians get out of here!’ ‘KGB, MIA, Soviet Army–to 
Moscow!’ ‘Do away with the dictatorship from Moscow!’ ‘full sovereignty!’ etc.”  Instead of 109
using force to silence such blatant opposition, the leadership had even encouraged some of this 
activity “hoping to co-opt nationalist organizations that generally support Gorbachev’s reform 
goals.”  Moscow even permitted the activities of the Baltic Popular Fronts, allowing them to fly 110
“pre-Soviet flags of independence” and to advance programs promoting actual independence 
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 from Moscow.  Even more, a CIA Intelligence Assessment in April, 1989 evaluated that the 111
Baltic nationalist movements had usurped the local authorities in setting the political agenda, 
threatening Moscow’s control of the Baltic region, excluding coercion.  At a December 112
Politburo meeting, heeding the Baltic states’ calls, Army General Yazov confirmed the removal 
of Soviet troops from several republics and he proposed withdrawing three more divisions in the 
following year.  In response, Ligachev argued that even though the leadership was functioning 113
on the perestroika agenda, “that does not mean that we should weaken the defense preparedness 
of the country.”  Although Gorbachev countered Ligachev and no one spoke in the latter’s 114
support, “the majority [of the Party members] ‘purse their lips’ and do not approve of 
[Gorbachev’s] liberalism” and the concessions given to the republics.  Even though the 115
majority did not openly oppose the concessions, the increasing allowances for the Baltic 
republics further fueled the nationalist movements, intensifying the pressure within the Party to 
create policy to contain these movements.  
Not only did nationalist movements incite debate over the reforms and possible methods 
to respond to these movements, but they also triggered a Russian nationalistic reaction from the 
Russian-speaking minorities within non-Russian republics. The article “Estonian People’s Front: 
What Does It Want? Published in ​Pravda ​revealed such sentiments in a debate over the First 
111 ​"Central Intelligence Agency, 'Rising Political Instability Under Gorbachev: Understanding the Problem 
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 Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party’s Central Committee, who was an Estonian.  Even 
though by this time, all first secretaries in the Union Republics were members of the titular 
nationalities, the article reported that  “among the Russian speaking populations one can hear 
apprehensions that now their interest are being jeopardized, since the First Secretary is ‘not one 
of ours.’”  Therefore, the nationalist movements and People’s Fronts provoked a Russian 116
nationalist response, adding to the social and political turbidity surrounding perestroika.  
At the conclusion of 1988, the CIA assessed that “strains in the leadership over national 
policy have been evident for some time.”  However, after Gorbachev restructured the 117
apparatus, the Party leadership appeared “to have tilted the balance in favor of greater tolerance 
for national assertiveness,” such as allowing the recognition of national languages and flying 
national flags, thus dismissing conservative concerns for the sake of the reform process.  118
Gorbachev transferred Chebrikov from his position as head of the KGB to chair the party’s legal 
commision, and he demoted Ligachev from “second secretary,” traditionally and informally the 
General Secretary’s second, to the head of agriculture. He also assigned Latvian party member 
Boris Pugo as the new head of the Party Control Committee to root out corruption that resisted 
from the Khrushchev and Brezhnev-era favoritism for republic mafias, a system that impeded 
perestroika’s economic and political reforms.  
Despite reorganizing the party apparatus, divisions within the party were becoming 
increasingly salient over endorsing a concessionist policy versus a coercive policy in response to 
the movements in the Baltics. Elements of the security apparatus, specifically the KGB and the 
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 Soviet Army, felt the nationalist movements were a security threat to the Union, and therefore 
they advocated for the use of military or police forces to maintain control. Other less 
reform-minded party members such as Ligachev also supported the traditional use of force as 
they did not feel a concessionist policy would abate the movements, but they would instead 
weaken the center’s control of the republics. On the other hand, reform-minded party members 
including Gorbachev, Yakovlev and Medvedev supported a concessionist policy as using force 
would signal the failure of glasnost and sociopolitical reform. As a result, factionalism 
intensified over Moscow’s relationship with the Baltic republics and its future role.  
 
The Party Debates the National Question (1989) 
In 1989 the Party continued to debate the Soviet Union’s role in relation to the Soviet 
republics and Moscow’s policy to handle the nationlist movements. In a February memorandum 
to Yakovlev from the Bogomolov Commission, which advised the leadership on how to 
implement perestroika, the commission proposed various consequences for the Soviet Union due 
to failures of perestroika and growing unrest in the republics. With the poor economic 
performance and the ambiguity of restructuring, the commission predicted that the ruling 
republican parties would lose power and that new political forces, such as members of People’s 
Fronts, would replace them. Therefore, the Communist party would lose influence in Eastern 
Europe as a central power, and even more, the socialist countries could fall “into the orbit of 
economic and political interest of the West.”   The commission warned that using force to stop 119
the nationalist movements or to preserve the preexisting relationships will be an economic 
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 burden, a reinforcement for the conservatives, and detrimental to the reform process–all 
exacerbating the crisis.  Not only would a forceful intervention greatly harm perestroika, but 120
the commission argued that it would not put an end to nationalist disintegration and protests.  
Reformists had argued that the success of perestroika would naturally abate the 
nationalist movements as the economy improved and restructuring provided greater democracy, 
but as it became clear perestroika would fail, the Party felt a sense of urgency. Gorbachev 
condemned both the conservative and reformist positions in a speech at the central committee in 
February. He admonished the position of the reformists, who hoped to hasten the restructuring 
process and even “skip some of its stages,” which radical actions would have increased 
ambiguity, and would have been too much of a shock for persisting “old way” institutions and 
attitudes.  Such drastic change would have been destabilizing and possibly have given the 121
People’s Fronts more influence as a political force. He also spoke against extremist movements 
and conservatives taking advantage of the public’s anxiety surrounding the movements to turn 
attitudes against restructuring and reform.  However, despite his condemnations, the Soviet 122
Union was still struggling to find a middle road to address the growing crisis. 
A CIA report for April, 1989, noted that the leadership was growing more polarized over 
how to respond to these at-times violent developments in the Baltics, creating the danger of a 
“divisive split in the leadership.”  Not only were the heated protests from the Baltic People’s 123
Fronts, but also the Russian minorities within the republics, “setting the stage for violent clashes 
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 in the republics where the Russians are in danger of becoming second-rate citizens.”  With the 124
concessions that Moscow had given to the People’s Fronts in accordance with glasnost and 
restructuring, the Soviet leadership was inadvertently fueling the tensions between the Russians 
and the native populations. These Russian nationalists sentiments also affected the attitude of 
party conservatives such as Ligachev and his supporters, the Soviet military, the Minister of 
Interior, and the KGB. The KGB feared that the leadership’s greater toleration of dissent would 
reduce the stability of the Soviet Union. Even though he previously sanctioned the withdrawal of 
troops from the Baltic region, General Yazov expressed military concerns over the rise of the 
nationalist movements and the leadership’s concessions to these movements. He reported a rise 
of anti-Army efforts in the Baltics and Transcaucasian republics where local leadership infringed 
upon the rights of servicemen and created unconstitutional laws to hinder USSR jurisdiction over 
youth military training and other Union functions.  Additionally, he argued that nationalistic 125
sentiment “poisoned” potential draftees within the Republics against service, and therefore 
consituted a threat to the Soviet Military.   126
The Baltic People’s Fronts not only acted as nationalistic movements, but they became a 
rising opposition party calling for elections and pluralism, threatening socialist rule and Soviet 
influence. At a Politburo meeting in May, Medvedev reported that the outcome of the elections 
in the Baltics resulted in mostly the election of participants in the Popular Fronts, who “ran as a 
force opposing the CPSU,” supporting separatism and nationalism.  Gorbachev responded to 127
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 this news arguing in line with party reformists that the leadership should learn to work with the 
various People’s Fronts to encourage them to remain in the Union rather than employing military 
force to maintain republic parties. Furthermore, in his speech to the Council of Europe in July, 
Gorbachev stated that it is “the sovereign right of each people to choose their social system at 
their own discretion.”  Gorbachev understood that the Baltic republics now had a different 128
relationship to the Soviet center than he had hoped. Instead of maintaining the pseudo-imperialist 
relationship of his predecessors or creating the Leninist super-state, the best scenario for 
Gorbachev was to federalize the Union. However, the failure of perestroika and concessions to 
maintain the Union coupled with the conservatives’ desire to use force to preserve a 
Stalinist-style union heightened discourse within the Party over future policy towards the 
republics. Gorbachev noted at a July conference that the polarization of opinions within the Party 
were accelerating with the growth of left-radical sentiments calling for decisive, quick 
transformations.  In his concluding speech, Gorbachev urged conservative and leftist forces to 129
join forces instead of divide. As a conservative voice at the conference, Ligachev argued that the 
exacerbated relations between nationalities and the uncertainty surrounding restructuring had 
created a situation “in which people fear for their safety… and for the country’s future.”  He 130
also stressed that “a multiparty system would mean the breakup of the Soviet Federation,” and 
argued for greater Party control.  Premier Ryzhkov also agreed that they must work to elevate 131
the prestige and role of the Party. RSFSR chairman Vorotnikov suggested enhancing the 
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 “sovereign rights of the Russian Federation” in the midst of nationalist movements to appease 
the growing unrest in the Russian republic and ethnic Russians in non-titular republics.  These 132
suggestions revealed the embedded Russophilia as part of Stalin’s legacy that remained in Party 
policy-making and conservative efforts to maintain Party power and Union sovereignty amid the 
growing anxiety surrounding restructuring and nationalist fervor.  
When the Lithuanian Communist Party split from the CPSU and called for full 
independence in March of 1988, the Moscow leadership was faced with “heated debate.”   In a 133
speech at the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Gorbachev stated that both the 
reformists and the conservatives were attempting to frighten the public through prospecting “a 
general collapse,” but he discounted such fears asserting they were merely political strategy.  In 134
another speech discussing Lithuania’s split, Gorbachev blamed the split on the republic Party 
leadership, which “deviated from the party line and went over to appeasement of and outside 
flirtation with nationalistic and separatist forces, to a splintering of the parties ranks.”  The 135
irony in his reasons for admonishing the Lithuanian party were not lost on party conservatives, as 
they had repeatedly opposed giving concessions to the nationalist opposition movements.  
 
The Dissolution of Party Unity and the Soviet Union (1990-1991) 
Prior to Lithuanian Party split, there were relatively few calls for sovereignty in the 
preceding years as the Baltic republics received concessions from Moscow to use pre-Union 
national symbols and to organize nationalist demonstrations. However, 1990 featured a series of 
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 declarations of independence and sovereignty, “beginning with Lithuania’s declaration of 
independence in March.”  By summer of 1990, the CPSU’s internationalist integrity was weak 136
and people feared a similar split within the CPSU as in the Communist Parties of some republics.
 Not only was political influence waning seriously, but also economic influence was under 137
threat. At a Party Congress in July, 1990, Politburo members and candidate members reported 
their position on restructuring and the current situation of the Union. Ryzhkov described how 
various republics wanted to create individual closed markets, which would allow the creation of 
trade barriers between republics and increased economic ties with the West. He noted that with 
“increasing national self-awareness” republics had begun to adopt legislation contradicting the 
USSR’s Constitution, which “could undermine” the state system.  Yakovlev urged the 138
“renewed party must move left.”  Notably, he stated “it is time to end the civil war that we 139
seem unable to get out of,” revealing the tense division within the Party over the policies 
concerning the center’s relations with the republics.  Vorotnikov commented on fears of an 140
inevitable split within the CPSU, disclosing that there were rumors to this effect circulating, even 
though he felt it was unlikely.  Boris Yeltsin, the new chairman of the RSFSR (the Russian 141
republic), fueled these fears, declaring “the country cannot be given orders any longer,” 
threatening the Russian republic would declare sovereignty.   In his speech on the Politburo 142
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 members’ reports at the July Congress, Gorbachev decided that the Party must abandon old 
institutions, democratize, and understand that the CPSU no longer held a monopoly on power.  143
Faced with the impending possibility that the Union would dissolve into merely a 
collection of sovereign republics, in a radical swing to the left, the Russian Supreme Soviet 
adopted economist Stanislav Shatalin’s radical ‘500 Day’ economic reform plan to hastily 
convert the economy into a market economy and give more economic autonomy to the republics.
 Shatalin was Gorbachev’s economic advisor, and even though Gorbachev initially endorsed 144
this plan, the Supreme Soviet of the CPSU approved a drastically more moderate plan, “basically 
gutting the 500-day program and smashing the alliance with Yeltsin and the democratic 
reformers.”  In addition to his sudden conservative economic turn, Gorbachev also appointed 145
conservatives to key positions in efforts to increase central authority, slowing the reform process 
he previously approved. Yakovlev was ousted from the party, conservative economist Vladimir 
Pavlov replaced Ryzhkov as prime minister, and Shevardnadze quit by the end of 1990, warning 
that a dictatorship was impending.  Gorbachev even turned to conservative ‘forces of order,’ 146
including the military and KGB in efforts to gain more control of the crisis situation.  KGB 147
chairman Kryuchkov stated in a speech that “democracy and glasnost [would] remain nothing 
but fine-sounding words if there is no law and order,” suggesting increased reliance on force 
rather than politics in the future, threatening perestroika.  In an ‘open letter’ Shatalin 148
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 condemned Gorbachev’s betrayal of “faithful comrades-in-arms from the beginning of 
perestroika” and his turn to “the ‘black colonels.’”   149
Even though Gorbachev’s shift to the right momentarily restrained the conservatives, 
who were outraged at Gorbachev’s radical reformist attempt to preserve the Union, as the 
economic crisis and independence movements continued, Gorbachev shifted back to the left once 
more. In August, 1991, negotiations for the “Treaty on the Union of Sovereign States,” which 
recognized the sovereignty of the republics, concluded and representatives prepared to sign on 
August 21.  However, faced with the reality of democratization and having to compete in a 150
multi-party system in the future, conservatives launched a desperate attempt to regain power 
through a failed coup. Rather than gaining power, the coup destroyed the remaining central 
power, discredited the organs of the Soviet center–the Party, bureaucracy, army and police–and 
created a power vacuum that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
 
Conclusion 
The rise of Baltic People’s Fronts in response to freedoms accompanying glasnost and 
discontent with Moscow’s unequal relationship with the republics exacerbated tensions in the 
steadily polarizing CPSU. The KGB and the Soviet Army feared the uncertainty and the 
destabilizing effects of restructuring that threatened Party power and Union authority, so they 
promoted use of force, stalled the reform process and clung to old institutions and methods of 
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 power. The reformists such as Yakovlev and Gorbachev increasingly grew more radical, urging 
faster transitions, offering concessions to the nationalist movements, short of independence, and 
favoring economic and political methods of influence rather than force. Traditionally, Moscow 
employed the Soviet Army to control unrest in the republics, but such use of force would 
undermine Gorbachev’s reform efforts and glasnost. As a result of not pursuing coercive force, 
reformists struggled to maintain a balance between promoting perestroika and glasnost while 
maintaining control over the increasingly restless republics.  
When the Baltic Republics called for independence, it became clear that concessionist 
efforts had failed to maintain the Union, prompting Gorbachev to radically endorse conservative 
policies. Gorbachev’s inconsistent allegiance to conservatives or leftists resulted in his increased 
political isolation and allowed Yeltsin and pro-nationalist forces in the Baltics to grow in power, 
further weakening the CPSU’s authority. While reform-minded members of the CPSU were 
willing to democratize and participate in elections, the conservatives feared losing their hold on 
power. The polarization of the party manifested into the conservatives weakly attempted coup 
that ushered the fall of the Soviet Union.  
Unlike previous leaderships, during Gorbachev’s years of reform, Moscow rejected 
traditional methods of coercion to maintain control in favor of concessions and endorsed 
democracy. In efforts to promote reform, Gorbachev inadvertently exacerbated the opportunity 
for people’s movements to organize and to gain power in the republics and threaten Moscow’s 
sovereignty over the republics. The growing threat the nationalism movements presented to the 
Union, especially as the Baltic Republics called for independence, intensified factionalism within 
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 the Party over how to respond to this challenge, ultimately resulting in a desperate and feeble 
conservative coup as the manifestation of the degree of disunity within the Party. 
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 Thesis Conclusion 
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union suffered increasing factionalism over policy 
debates surrounding the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the cooperative movement, and 
concessionist policy toward nationalist movements in the Baltics.  
Soviet involvement in the Afghan war caused bitter disagreement within the security 
apparatus as the Soviet army advised strongly against intervention while Moscow endorsed the 
KGB’s suggestion to invade. The internecine fighting intensified during the Soviet withdrawal as 
the Soviet army and aligned Party members advocated for a quick and complete withdrawal of 
troops from Afghanistan while the KGB and Shevardazde advocated for continued Soviet 
presence to support the weak PDPA. The factionalism within the CPSU reflected the infighing in 
the PDPA with the Soviet army camp supporting the Khalq faction that made up most of the 
Afghan army and the KGB camp supporting the Parcham faction that the KGB installed as the 
PDPA’s leadership. As more money was sunk into the bleeding wound, more lives were lost, and 
the future security of the PDPA appeared bleak, Gorbachev supported the Soviet army’s position 
for a complete withdrawal and to leave the fate of the PDPA with its leaders.  
When Gorbachev introduced market reforms, such as the co-operative movement, he was 
met with resistance from the security apparatus and other conservative members who wanted to 
maintain their power and the traditional command-style economy. In contrast, reformists such as 
Gorbachev and Yakovlev supported increasingly radical market reforms and restructuring of the 
economy. As the market policies failed due to conservative efforts to hinder their implementation 
and the continued centralized control over the economy, it became clear that a halfway measure 
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 would no longer work and the Party split into a pro-command economy faction and a pro-market 
economy faction.  
The failings of perestroika undermined Moscow’s authority, and the increased economic 
authority allocated to localities accompanied with glasnost fueled the rise of nationalist 
movements in the Soviet republics. The CPSU divided over how to respond to this growing 
threat to the Union with reform-minded members promoting a concessionist policy to appease 
these movements while the more conservative forces, including the security apparatus, urged the 
use of force to quell the nationalist calls. When the Baltic republics called for independence, it 
became clear that the concessionist policy had failed, so the Party reformists drafted the radical 
500-day plan. However, Gorbachev swung in alliance with the conservatives in contrary efforts 
to bolster the center’s control. Due to political backlash, Gorbachev aligned again with the 
reformists in favor of elections and a Union of States rather than republics, and conservatives 
who were fearful for their hold on power launched a failed coup, nailing the final coffin in the 
CPSU and the Soviet Union.  
 A commonality in all of these cases for the rise of factionalism within the Communist 
Party is not only increasingly salient divisions, but also the progressive isolation of the General 
Secretary. Gorbachev inconsistently supported reformists’ positions on the co-operative 
movement policy and the concessionist policy and he similarly was varying in support for the 
KGB camp’s desire to slow the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Additionally, Gorbachev’s 
policies of glasnost and perestroika undermined the basic traditional function of the CPSU as he 
encouraged open, in-party debate and restructuring that weakened party members' control on the 
economy and their positions of power. This thesis reveals the fragile nature of the Soviet 
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 party-state without having a strong leader to coerce consensus and to enforce centralized control, 
or, essentially, to forcefully maintain party unity.  
Even though Gorbachev envisioned a prosperous Soviet Union thriving on a 
centrally-controlled market economy and serving as the leader of the socialist world under the 
banners of glasnost and perestroika, in reality, the entrenched power relations and traditional 
values within the party were diametrically opposed to reformists policies, lighting the kindling 
for factionalism within the Party and heralding the fall of the Communist giant.  
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